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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
H A R O L D K. B E E C H E R & 
ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. \ Case No. 
13610 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y 
CORPORATION and 
SALT L A K E COUNTY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Brief of Defendants-Respondents 
Salt Lake City Corporation and 
Salt Lake County 
N A T U R E O F CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant commenced this action in 
the lower court to recover the sum of $130,079.45 from 
the defendants-respondents for additional architect's 
fees allegedly owing to the plaintiff-appellant as a re-
sult of the construction of the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE 
B Y L O W E R COURT 
At the pretrial hearing, the defendants-respondents 
moved for summary judgment, judgment on the plead-
ings and dismissal of plaintiff-appellant's amended 
complaint as a matter of law. After ten months during 
which the plaintiff-appellant filed no response to the 
written memoranda of the defendants below, the lower 
court granted judgment in favor of defendants-re-
spondents of no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants-respondents seek to have the lower 
court's Judgment dismissing plaintiff-appellant's com-
plaint affirmed and costs awarded to them. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The undisputed facts as shown by the pleadings, 
discovery and the record in this case are as follows: 
1. By substantially identical agreements dated 
March 1, 1960 and May 20, 1960, Salt Lake City Corp-
oration and Salt Lake County contracted with Harold 
K. Beecher & Associates, a Utah corporation, for it to 
provide architectural services in connection with the 
construction of a proposed Public Safety and Jail 
Building. (See Exhibits I and I I I attached to the 
Amended Complaint, R. 27-33, 36-44). 
2 
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2. During the period from January 1, 1960 to 
October 6, 1960, the architect prepared preliminary 
drawings, outline specifications and cost estimates re-
lating to a proposed "High Rise Building", which 
plans were never approved by the city or county. (See 
items No. 1 and No. 2 of the Detailed Statement at-
tached as Exhibit V I to the Amended Complaint, R. 
47-49, and defendant-respondent Salt Lake City Corp-
oration's Request for Admission of Fact No. 10 ad-
mitted by plaintiff-respondent, R. 222, 223, 229). 
3. As a result of the disapproval of the preliminary 
plans for a "High Rise Building", the architect entered 
into supplemental agreements with the City on No-
vember 10,1960, and the County on December 30, 1960. 
(See Exlibits I I and IV attached to the Amended 
Complaint, R. 34-35; 36-37). These supplement agree-
ments provided payment of $36,000 to the architect, 
recited that the architect had performed services pur-
suant to its employment contract which had not been 
approved by the governing bodies of the city and 
county as required under paragraph 5 of the original 
contract and then provided as follows: 
" 1 . The parties agree that the aforesaid agree-
ment, together with all the terms and provisions 
thereof is in full force and effect and shall re-
main in full force and effect until and unless 
terminated pursuant to the terms thereof. 
"2. The parties agree that the Architect has 
performed services under the terms of the afore-
said agreement of a value to the owner of 
$18,000 and that this amount would be due and 
3 
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owing by the Owner to the Architect if the work 
done by the Architect had in fact been approved 
by the Owner. 
"3. The Owner hereby agrees to pay the 
Architect the sum of $18,000 and does in this in-
stance, only, waive the provision of prior ap-
proval before making such payment. 
"4. The Architect, in consideration of the pay-
ment herein stipulated, acknowledges that under 
the terms of the aforesaid agreement he is not 
entitled to be paid for any work done until the 
same is approved by the Owner, acknowledges 
that the waiver embodied herein does not in any 
way affect any subsequent payment or payments 
which may become due under the terms of the 
aforesaid agreement; and further acknowledges 
that the amount of $18,000 herein stipulated 
constitutes full payment for all services rendered 
by the Architect as of the date of this addendum 
and that the Architect will not be entitled to 
any further or additional payments from the 
Owner until such time as other stages of the 
Architect's work have been completed and ap-
proved by the Salt Lake City Board of Com-
missioners, as provided in the aforesaid agree-
ment. The $18,000 paid pursuant hereto shall 
be deemed to be part of the total fee due the 
Architect under said agreement" (Emphasis 
added) 
Thus, rather than termnate its contract with the 
Architect when the Preliminary Plans and Drawings 
were not accepted, the City and County paid $18,000 
each, for a total payment of $36,000. This payment 
was made for unapproved services performed by the 
Architect to November 10, 1960. The parties, by said 
4 
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Supplemental Agreements, elected and agreed to pro-
ceed under the original contract with a new design con-
cept and agreed that the $36,000 paid to and received 
by the Arcbtect under the Supplemental Agreements 
was for benefits to the City and County and would 
apply against its total fee on the project. (R. 34-35, 
36-37). 
4. The redesigned project was ultimately ap-
proved, bids were obtained, and the contract for con-
struction was let. Work under said construction con-
tract was commenced on June 19, 1963 and construc-
tion of the project was completed on or about March 
21, 1968. (See Item No. 4 of the Detailed Statement 
attached as Exhibit VI to the Amended Complaint, It. 
64-68). 
5. The Architect's contracts with the City and 
County dated March 1, 1960 and May 20, 1960, re-
spectively, fixed no time within which the services there-
under were to be completed by the Architect; rather, 
they clearly contemplated an extended period of con-
struction by requiring additional payment for on-site 
inspection if such expense exceeded $15,000.00. Para-
graph 7 of the Architect's contract with the City and 
County specifically provided as follows: 
"7. G E N E R A L A D M I N I S T R A T I O N . 
The Architect shall furnish at his expense a 
qualified on-site inspector, acceptable to both 
Owner and Architect, during the entire time the 
construction work is in progress, whose duties 
shall consist of checking all shop drawings, for 
approval of the City Engineer, to determine the 
5 
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quality and acceptance of the material and/or 
equipment proposed to be used in the facilities 
being constructed; to supervise and inspect all 
phases of the work being done. 
. /'The costs, to be paid by the Architect for 
the above services to be rendered, shall not ex-
ceed $15,000.00. In the event these services ex-
ceed this amount, it is hereby agreed by all con-
cerned that the Owner shall assume all costs in 
excess thereof." (Emphasis added) (R. 30). 
6. The City and County did pay to the plaintiff-
appellant Architect the amount of $26,825.20 for the 
additional on-site inspection in accordance with the fore-
going paragraph 7. (See defendant-respondent Salt 
Lae City Corporation's Request for Admission of Fact 
No. 7 which is admitted by the plaintiff-appellant, R. 
222,228). 
7. The plaintiff-appellant received the sum of 
$609,385.59 for its Architect's fees on the Metropolitan 
Hall of Justice, which sum does not include the amount 
of $26,825.20 for additional on-site inspection. (See 
defendant-respondent Salt Lake City Corporation's 
Request for Admission of Fact No. 9, admitted by 
plaintiff, R. 222, 229). 
8. The plaintiff-appellant allegedly filed its claim 
for additional compensation dated January 22, 1969, 
with the defendant-respondents on or about January 
28th or 29th of 1969. (See paragraph 4 of the Amended 
Complaint and Exhibits V and V I attached thereto, 
R. 24, 47-70). Under the Detailed Statement, the 
6 
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architect-appellant alleges that the City and County 
respondents are indebted to it in the total amount of 
$130,079.45 for eight separate items of alleged extra 
services. Its claim is based on paragraph 4 of its orig-
inal Agreement with the City and County, which reads 
as follows: 
"4. E X T R A SERVICES A N D S P E C I A L 
CASES. If the Architect is caused extra draft-
ing or other expenses due to changes ordered by 
the Owner, or due to the delinquency or insolv-
ency of the Owner or the Contractor, or as a re-
sult of damage by fire, he shall be equitably paid 
for such extra expense and the service involved. 
"Work let on any cost-plus basis shall be sub-
ject to a special charge in accord with the special 
service required. 
"If any work designed or specified by the 
Architect is abandoned or suspended, in whole 
or in part, the Architect is to be paid for the 
service rendered on account of it." 
These separate claims of plaintiff-appellant are as fol-
lows : 
A. Item No. 1: A claim of $6,750.00 for the al-
leged attendance of two architect employees at 
approximately 75 meetings of the Citizens Ad-
visory Committee and its Executive Committee. 
The plaintiff-appellant was unable to provide to 
the lower court information as to the dates, loca-
tions and names of persons in attendance at said 
alleged meetings. Rather, plaintiff-appellant 
simply indicates that such meetings occurred as 
a result of the change in the basic design con-
7 
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cept from a "high rise" building on or about 
November 10, 1960, when the supplemental 
agreement with Salt Lake City was executed. 
(See defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's 
Interrogatory No. 2 and plaintiff's answer 
thereto, R, 213 ,214, 238-240). However, by the 
plaintiff-appellant's own statement it was "The 
Citizen's Advisory Committee who directed the 
architect to abandon the preliminary drawings, 
the outline specifications and the cost estimates 
that had been proposed for a "High Rise Build-
ing" and that such drawings, specifications and 
cost estimates were proposed during the period 
from January 1, 1960 to October 6, 1960. See 
Item No. 2 of the Detailed Statement attached 
as Exhibit VI of the Amended Complaint. (R. 
60-63). Thus, October 6, 1960 constituted the 
finale for the "High Rise" concept and the inter-
vention of the Citizen's Advisory Committee in 
the architect's redesign program. The Citizen's 
Advisory Committee asked the architect to re-
analyze the Michael Saphier space analysis dated 
August 24, 1960, which resulted in a 5-page re-
port, submitted about October 6, 1960, and re-
vised October 11, 1960, following which the de-
cision to redesign the building was made. (See 
plaintiff-appellant's answer to Salt Lake City 
Corporation's Interrogatory No. 5 (a).(R. 216, 
241). The plaintiff-appellant architect was fully 
paid for these services under the November 10, 
1960 Supplemental Agreement. (R. 34-35, 36-
37). 
B. Item No. 2: A claim in the amount of $20,-
981.30 for alleged indirect and direct expenses 
in connection with the preparation of prelimin-
ary drawings, outline specifications and cost esti-
mates for a "High Rise Building" which were 
s 
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never approved by the city and county. The 
claim specifically states that these services were 
performed " (d)uring the period January 1, 1960 
to October 6, 1960 . . ." (See Item No. 2 on 
pages 2-4 of the Detailed Statement attached as 
Exhibit V I to the Amended Complaint, R. 60-
63). Such services were expressly covered by the 
Supplemental Agreements between the architect 
and the City and County dated November 10, 
1960 and December 30, 1960. Under these agree-
ments the architect accepted $36,000.00 in "full 
payment for all services rendered by the archi-
tect as of the date of this addendum . . . " (See 
Exhibits I I and IV attached to the Amended 
Complaint, R. 34, 35, 45, 46). 
C. Item No. 3 is not a subject of this appeal. 
D. Item No. 4 is the major claim of the archi-
tect and totals the sum of $95,893.15 for alleged 
delay in the completion of the project by con-
structing the building complex in two phases to 
permit utilization of the temporary police build-
ing on the site, until the new police building was 
constructed. The architect alleges that there was 
an increase of construction time from 739 cal-
endar days to 1,736 calendar days by reason of 
the foregoing . Said construction period alleged-
ly lasted from June 19, 1963 to March 21, 1968. 
(See Item No. 4 of the Detailed Statement at-
tached as Exhibit V I to the Amended Com-
plaint, R. 64-68). 
However, the architect's contracts with the City 
and County fixed no time within which its serv-
ices thereunder were to be completed, but specif-
ically provided for payment by the City and 
County of on-site inspection costs in excess of 
9 
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$15,000.00. (See paragraph 7 of Exhibit I at-
tached to the Amended Complaint, R. 30-31). 
The City and County paid the architect $26,-
825.20 for additional on-site inspection in accord-
ance with said agreement. (See Salt Lake City 
Corporation's Request for Admission of Fact 
No. 7 which is admitted by plaintiff-appellant, 
R. 222; 228). Furthermore, the plaintiff-appel-
lant received 75% of its basic fees prior to the 
time construction even commenced on the pro* 
ject. (See paragraph 5 of Exhibit I attached to 
the Amended Complaint, R. 29, 30, and Salt 
Lake City Corporation's Request for Admission 
of Fact No. 34, admitted bv plaintiff-appellant, 
R. 226;332). 
E . Item No. 5 is not a subject of this appeal. 
F . Item No. 6: A claim of $1,250.00 for alleged 
time expended by Harold K. Beecher in "as-
sembling documents and information instructing 
City Attorney, writing letters, giving deposition, 
attending District and Supreme Court hearings, 
etc." in connection with the taxpayer's suit 
against Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County 
for awarding the jail equipment contract to the 
second low bidder. 
That case, Clayton v. Salt Lake City and Salt 
Lake County, 15 U.2d 57, 387 P.2d 93, was 
decided December 2, 1963, and affirmed the 
award of a contract to the second low bidder, 
Southern Steel Company, whose price was over 
the low bidder by a sum of $55,321.00. (See de-
cision of this court and Salt Lake City Corpor-
ation's Request for Admission of Facts No. 17 
and 18, admitted by the plaintiff-appellant, R. 
224; 231). The architect's fee on the said jail 
equipment contract was ten percent (10%) of 
10 
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the construction cost thereof. (See paragraphs 
B and 3 of Exhibit I attached to the Amended 
Complaint, R. 27, 29, and Salt Lake City Corp-
oration's Request for Admission of Fact No. 
19, admitted by the plaintiff-appellant, R. 224; 
231). Therefore, the successful defense of that 
case resulted in the architect receiving $5,532.10 
more than it would have received had said suit 
been successful in requiring the letting of the 
jail equipment contract to the low bidder. 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney Jack L. 
Crellin handled the city's defense in the Clayton 
case from its inception to its conclusion and spent 
only one afternoon with Mr. Beecher at his home 
with respect to preparation of an affidavit to be 
filed in support of the city's motion for sum-
mary judgment in said case. (See Salt Lake 
City Corporation's Request for Admissions of 
Facts Nos. 22 and 24, admitted by plaintiff-ap-
pellant, R. 231). Neither Mr. Crellin nor the 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City ever 
requested the plaintiff-appellant or Harold K. 
Beecher to attend the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment before the District Court or 
an argument on appeal before the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in said suit. (See 
Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Ad-
mission of Facts No. 25, admitted by plaintiff-
appellant, R. 225; 231). The city received no 
benefit from his attendance, which was done 
solely out of his own interest and curiousity. 
G. Item No. 7: A claim in the amount of 
$3,000.00 for alleged preparation of space an-
alysis surveys required by the Citizen's Advisory 
Committee when it decided the Michael Saphier 
space analysis dated August 24, 1960, was in-
u 
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correct. The final 16 page analysis survey was 
prepared and submitted by the architect to the 
City and County on or about December 1, 1960, 
with subsequent revisions on or about Decem-
ber 15, 1960, and J a n u a r y 3, 1961. They were 
entirely completed prior to February 1, 1961. 
(See Salt Lake City Corporation's Request 
for Admissions of Facts Nos. 27 and 28, ad-
mitted by plaintiff-appellant, R. 225; 231, and 
plaintiff-appellant's answer to Salt Lake City 
Corporation's Interrogatory No. 5 ( a ) , R. 216, 
217; R. 241, 242.) The architect had earlier sub-
mitted a 27 page space analysis report dated May 
16, 1960, and a 5 page space analysis report 
about October 6, 1960, which was revised about 
October 11, 1960, after which the architect was 
directed to redesign the building. (See plaintiff-
appellant's answer to Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion's Interrogatory No. 5 ( a ) , R. 216, 217; 241, 
242.) 
H . I tem No. 8: A claim of $1,000.00 for al-
leged preparation of square foot drawings and 
computations to determine the amount of space 
to be occupied by the city, the county and jointly 
in the Metropolitan H a l l of Justice. The first 
of such drawings and computations was made 
in September or October of 1960, with respect 
to the feigh rise building, the second submittal 
was early in the design stage of the present 
building, the third was in response to a request 
prior to December 22, 1964, and the last was sub-
mitted about February 14, 1966 with the final 
revision thereof submitted about October 6, 1966. 
(See plaintiff-appellant's answer to Salt Lake 
City Corporation's Interrogatory No. 7 ( a ) , R. 
217, 218; 242, 243). The plaintiff-appellant ad-
mits that all services included under I tem No. 8 
12 
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were performed prior to October 7, 1966. (See 
Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Ad-
missions of Facts No. 33, admitted by plaintif f-
appellant, R. 226; 232). 
9. In December, 1965, the plaintiff-appellant com-
menced an action in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County against Salt Lake City Corporation, designated 
as Civil No. 161546, in which the plaintiff sought re-
covery against the City for several claims allegedly 
due for services rendered and money expended under 
the terms of the same contract attached as Exhibit I 
to the plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint in this 
action. However, none of the claims included in Items 
No. 1, No. 2, No. 6 and No. 7 herein were asserted in 
that prior action. (See Salt Lake City Corporation's 
Request for Admissions of Facts Nos. 29 and 30, ad-
mitted by plaintiff-appellant, R. 225; 231, 232.) 
£tt€p*irt(\ 
10. Tflyppniting only inspection duties, the last work 
on the project by plaintiff-appellant architect was 
prior to October 11, 1966. (R. 217, 218, 242, 243). The 
plaintiff-appellant architect filed no claim with the City 
or County for the claims subject of this suit until sub-
sequent to January 22,1969. (R. 47). 
11. The claims of plaintiff-appellant were denied 
in writing by City Attorney Jack L. Crellin, February 
9, 1970, who stated that plaintiff-appellant owed the 
city $249.84. (R. 92). On March 6, 1970, the plaintiff-
appellant filed a Second Petition, wherein he requested 
of the City and petitioned the County Commission for 
arbitration regarding his January 22, 1969 claim. (R. 
13 
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72). The County Attorney advised against such a pro-
cedure in that the claim was deemed denied under the 
provisions of 63-30-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
and the letters of the City Attorney of February 9, 
1970. (R. 73). Both the City and County refused 
arbitration as requested in the second petition. (R. 76, 
77). 
12. The plaintiff-appellant failed to file suit until 
April 2, 1971, approximately 2 years 3 months after 
filing its claim. (R. l ) . This suit was commenced more 
than one year after the claim's denial by the City and 
County. (Sections 10-7-77 and 63-30-1 et seq. Utah 
Code Ann. 1953; R. 73; R. 76, 77; R. 180). 
13. On June 13, 1972, plaintiff-appellant's at-
torney certified to the court: 
(a) "That he had interviewed all witnesses he 
might call at the trial of the case;" 
(b) "That all needed drawings and docu-
ments, etc., are ready to be offered in evidence;" 
(c) ". . . all necessary discovery had been 
completed;" 
(d) "All necessary examination and deposi-
tion had been concluded." (R. 210) 
14. The matter was set for trial January 12, t9T2. 
(R. 211). Thereafter, on December 5, 1972, plaintiff 
appellant requested a pretrial conference. (R. 235). 
Said conference was approved and subsequently held 
before Judge D. Frank Wilkins, February 22, 1973 and 
14 
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flflarch 5, 1973. (R. 237, 246, 247). At said hearing, a 
motion for summary judgment to dismiss on pleadings 
and judgment on pleading were received and upon 
request leave was granted to submit memoranda of 
law. Defendants submitted theirs on or about March 8, 
1973. (R. 249, 251, 255). Plaintiff-appellant filed no 
response for more than 10 months. The Lower Court 
after studying the matter entered judgment in favor 
of defendants Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County 
January 22, 1947 on six of the eight claims, but re-
served for trial the remaining issues and a counter-
claim for trial. (R. 249, 250). 
15. Plaintiff-appellant filed a "Petition for an 
Intermediate Appeal" on or about J&ebruary 22, 1974. 
This request was denied March 5, raw. (Utah Supreme 
Court case Number 13605). At the same date of filing 
said petition, plaintiff-appellant filed a "Notice of Ap-
peal" with the Third District Court. (R. 278). Despite 
the Petition for Intermediate Appeal's denial, plaintiff-
appellant filed an appeal brief with this court. De-
fendant-respondent Salt Lake City filed a Motion to 
Dismiss said appeal, which the court took under ad-
visement. Subsequently, the parties stipulated to a 
dismissal of the matters reserved for trial and this brief 
is submitted on the matters subject of Judge Wilkins 
Pre-Trial Judgment decision. 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
W H E N A CONTRACT F O R A R C H I T E C -
T U R A L S E R V I C E S S T A T E S NO T I M E 
W I T H I N W H I C H T H E A R C H I T E C T U R A L 
S E R V I C E S T H E R E U N D E R A R E TO B E 
C O M P L E T E D A N D T H E F E E O F W H I C H I S 
B A S E D ON A P E R C E N T A G E O F T H E CON-
S T R U C T I O N COST, NO CLAIM F O R A D D I -
T I O N A L C O M P E N S A T I O N F O R CONSTRUC-
T I O N D E L A Y MAY BE A L L O W E D TO T H E 
A R C H I T E C T . 
Item No. 4 of plaintiff-appellant's detailed state-
ment, dated January 22, 1969 and attached as Exhibit 
VI to plaintiff-appellant's amended complaint, consti-
tutes a claim .against the defendants-respondents to 
the amount £g $95,893.15. I t was submitted to de-
fendants-respondents as a demand for additional com-
pensation above a fixed six percent architectural fee 
agreement. Plaintiff-appellant alleged the claim is for 
expenses caused by delay in the construction time re-
quired for the completion of the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice. I t is plaintiff-appellant's contentions that such 
period of time was not contemplated by the parties 
when they entered into the original contract for archi-
tectural services. 
Importantly, however, it should be noted that the 
contract for the construction of the complex was actu-
ally completed within the time prescribed in the con-
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struction contract. Further, the undisputed facts dis-
close that the plaintiff-appellant's contracts with the 
City and County fix no time within/thk architectural 
services thereunder were to be completed. Rather, his 
compensation was to be a fixed fee of six percent of 
the construction cost. (R-27). However, extra compen-
sation was agreed to be paid if: (a) Changes were 
made in approved drawings; (b) Expenses were in-
curred by "delinquency" or "insolvency" of the owner 
or contractor; or (c) Expenses were incurred because 
work designed or specified on the approved project was 
abandoned or suspended. See paragraph 4 of the parties 
agreement, Statement of Fact 7 supra at p. 6; R-29. 
Since none of these agreed contingencies are even al-
leged to have precipitated this claim, the clear contract 
provisions for a fixed six percent fee bars extra com-
pensation under the explicit terms of the contract as a 
matter of law. 
Plaintiff-appellant architect, however, asserts parol 
evidence should be admitted to show intent. In that 
assertion the architect does not show how the written 
agreement between the parties or its supplements are 
vague or ambiguous as to need clarification. Rather, 
he seeks parol evidence, to create a new term which was 
not part of the written integration of the parties under-
standings, which agreements generously paid to the 
architect over $609,000.00 as a six percent architectural 
fee based on the construction cost. 
This court has consistently denied the use of parol 
evidence to modify such an integrated, complete state-
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ment of terms in a written contract. The court has 
correctly observed: 
"The rule is well settled, that where the parties 
reduce to writing what appears to be a complete 
and certain agreement, it will, in the absence of 
fraud, be conclusively presumed that the writing 
contained the whole of the agreement between 
the parties and that is a complete memorial of 
such agreement, and that parol evidence of the 
contemporaneous conversation, representations, 
or statements will not be received for the purpose 
of varying or adding to the terms of the written 
document." Rainford v. Rytting, 22 U.2d 252, 
451 P.2d 769 (1969) (Emphasis added) 
Further, in the case before the bar, the contract 
itself is clear that the parties contemplated an extended 
construction period and made provisions for extra pay 
to the architect for such expenses. The agreement pro-
vided that the architect was to: 
"Furnish at his expense a qualified on-site in-
spector, acceptable to the owner and architect, 
during the entire time the construction work is in 
progress, . . ." (Paragraph 7 of the party's con-
tract attached as Exhibit VI to plaintiff-appel-
lant's amended complaint, R. 30) (Emphasis 
added) 
Also, under the said contract, the architect was to pay 
the cost of providing all inspections; however, such cost 
was not to exceed the sum of $15,000.00. The agree-
ment specifically provided that: 
"In the event these services exceed this 
amount, it is hereby agreed by all concerned that 
the owner (Salt Lake City and County) shall 
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assume all costs in excess thereof." (Paragraph 
7 of the contract between the parties, R. 30). 
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract, plaintiff 
submitted a bill for and received the sum of $26,825.20 
for additional on-site inspections. Not only did the 
plaintiff-appellant architect receive the above stated 
benefits, but on November 10, 1960, entered into a 
supplemental agreement with the defendants-respond-
ents whereunder he agreed to receive a total of $36,-
000.00 for work done but not approved, knowing that 
a new type of design was desired. (R. 34) This 
amended agreement incorporated by reference the 
earlier agreement and made no amendment with regard 
to a specified time for construction completion or pay-
ment for delays which would follow starting over on 
the project. 
Thus, it is absolutely clear that under the terms of 
the agreement the parties intentionally did not fix the 
time within which the architect's services were to be 
completed; rather, they expressly recognized that the 
construction period could extend beyond the time fixed 
by the on-site inspection to be provided by the architect. 
Under these circumstances, the law is clear that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to additional compensation as 
alleged and parol evidence is not admissible to modify 
the agreement. 
Supportive of this conclusion is the case law deal-
ing specifically with this issue. Thus in the case of 
Osterling v. First National Bank, an architect sued to 
recover additional compensation for delay in the con-
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struction of a bank building, claiming that changes were 
made in the details of the structure which almost dou-
bled the original contract cost and delayed completion 
of the project for some eight months. The court specif-
ically held that the architect was not entitled to extra 
compensation because of the delay in the construction 
of the building, where the contract fixed no time within 
which his services were to be completed. The court 
specifically stated: 
"The claim for compensation for delay is also 
without merit. The contract under which he 
claims fixes no time within which his services 
were to be completed. The building actually 
cost almost double the amount originally contem-
plated and his commissions were correspondingly 
increased. This was adequate compensation for 
the delay incident to the construction of the en-
larged building, but this is not the reason for 
our refusal to allow his claim. He was not en-
titled to make it under the contract which he 
himself prepared." Osterling v. First National 
Bank, 105 A. 633 (Pa. 1918); 5 Am.Jur.2d, 
"Architects." § 14 at p. 676. 
The case before the bar is virtually identical 
facts m the Osterling case. Here the total cost of the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice was increased considerably 
from that envisioned at the time the contract was ex-
ecuted in March 1960. Extra work orders alone in-
creased the plaintiff-appellant architect's fees in excess 
of $42,000.00. (See defendant Salt Lake City Corp-
oration's Request for Admissions of Facts Nos. 3 and 
5, admitted by plaintiff ;R. 221, 228). 
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An additional case illustrative and supportive of 
this principle that an architect may not receive an addi-
tional fee on an architectural percentage contract when 
that contract does not fix a time for completion, is 
McDonald Brothers v. Whitney County Court, 8 Ky. 
L. Rep. 874 (1887) as discussed in Annotation, 20 
A.L.R. 1356, 1360-1361. As in the case before the bar, 
the architect's contract contained no limitation or con-
ditions as to the time for the construction of the build-
ing. However, the architect was obligated to super-
intend the construction of the project for a specified 
fee. Also, the construction contract contained a pro-
vision that if any charges were made by the archi-
tect for supervision of the construction work which 
extended longer than the specified time agreed upon 
for the completion of the building of the project, such 
charges would be deducted from the amount of the con-
struction contract price for the benefit of the architect. 
Thereafter, the original contractor abandoned the pro-
ject and it was let to a second building contractor, who 
refused to agree to the provisions for deductions for 
additional architect's charges. The architect then 
sought to recover for the delay involved in the com-
pletion of the work. 
The court held that inasmuch as the architect's 
contract was for a definite sum without limit or condi-
tion as to time, he could not recover on the theory that 
the provisions of the building contract modified his 
own contract. Again the rule is consistent and unequiv-
ocal. An architect may not recover for the delay in the 
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construction time unless his contract so provides by a 
specific limitation as to the time within which his serv-
ices are to be performed. 
In the instant case, the facts are clear and un-
disputed that the plaintiff-appellant agreed to pro-
vide architectural services, including superintending 
the construction of the project, for six percent of the 
cosntruction fees; it is without dispute that this fee of 
over $609,000.00 was fully paid. There was no time in 
the contract set for completion; rather, this contingency 
was covered by a provision indemnifying the architect 
for any out-of-pocket inspection expenses he incurred 
should those expenses exceed the expense contemplated 
in the contract. The plaintiff-appellant indeed received 
full additional compensation for these services of ap-
proximately $27,000.00, almost double the $15,000.00 
base expense figure in the fpwripH agreement. 
Further, it is without dispute that the plaintiff-
appellant architect received an additional sum exceed-
ing $42,000.00 by virtue of extra work orders in the 
agreement. In addition, the parties had knowledge 
that the first preliminary drawings were not accepted 
and signed a supplemental agreement knowing delay 
was evident, without amending the fee arrangements 
and without setting a time limit for completion. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the 
lower court properly held that Item No. 4 claimed by 
the architect failed to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted and that the defendants-respondents 
were entitled to a judgment of no cause of action as a 
matter of law on this issue. 
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POINT I I 
T H E NOVEMBER 10,1960 SUPPLEMENT-
AL AGREEMENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
IS A FULL ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
SATISFYING ALL CLAIMS FOR COMPEN-
SATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED 
PRIOR TO THAT DATE. SAID SUPPLE-
MENTAL CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO 
BY T H E PARTIES, SUPPORTED BY VALU-
ABLE CONSIDERATION AND IS A COM-
PLETE, UNAMBIGUOUS EXPRESSION OF 
T H E PARTIES UNDERSTANDING; AS 
SUCH IT IS A VALID BINDING AGREE-
MENT TO BE ENFORCED. 
Items No. 1 and No. 2 of plaintiff-appellant archi-
tect's claim concern a request for payment for attend-
ing some 75 meetings alleged to have been attended 
by it and for unapproved architectural services rend-
ered prior to November 10, 1960, totalling some $27,-
731.30. The assertion is utterly perplexing in view of 
a clear and unambiguous agreement of November 10, 
1960 whereunder plaintiff-appellant architect agreed 
to and in fact accepted $36,000.00 as payment for all 
services rendered prior to that date. I t is also perplex-
ing in view of the fact that the city and county were 
not appraised of its claim or its intention to make such 
a claim for a period of in excess of eight years from 
the date of this supplemental agreement. (R-24) 
The claim is the furthermore startling in that after 
receiving the $36,000.00 cash benefit, plaintiff-appel-
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lant architect in this litigation now challenges the val-
idity of the supplemental contract by alleging: (a) I t 
is void for lack of consideration; (b) The agreement 
does not mean what it clearly states and that the archi-
tect should be able, by parol evidence, to have a trial 
on its intent; and (c) I t is invalid because it was ob-
tained by economic coercion. See page 9-13 of plaintiff-
appellant's Brief. These matters will be discussed 
separately. 
A. C O N S I D E R A T I O N 
The facts are undisputed that on the 1st day of 
March, 1960 and on the 20th day of May, 1960, the 
parties entered into substantially identical agreements 
whereunder the city and county agreed to pay the 
architect a fee of six percent of the construction cost 
of a project for the construction of the Metropolitan 
Hall of Justice. Said agreement provided that pay-
ment to the architect would be made on a schedule as 
follows: 
"Upon completion of the schematic studies 
and proper approval of the same, a sum equal 
to ten percent of the Basic Rate, computed upon 
a reasonable estimated cost." 
"Upon completion of the preliminary studies 
and proper approval of the same, a sum equal 
to fifteen percent of the Basic Rate, computed 
upon a reasonable estimated cost." (R. 29) (Em-
phasis added) 
Significantly, none of this work performed by the 
architect prior to November 10, 1970 was satisfactory 
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to the defendants-respondents and was never approved. 
Rather, after seeing the preliminary work, it was de-
termined that the "high rise" concept was not desired 
and a new design approach should be undertaken. 
Therefore, the parties entered into a supplemental 
agreement whereunder compensation would be made to 
the architect for the unapproved work and expenses he 
had incurred therein, to keep the prior contract in full 
force and effect, and waive a provision in the earlier 
agreement regarding prior approval. The said sup-
plemental agreement dated with Salt Lake City, No-
vember 10, 1980 and December 30, 1960 with Salt Lake 
County specifically states as follows: 
"4. The architect, in consideration of the pay-
ment herein stipulated, acknowledges that under 
the terms of the aforesaid agreement he is not 
entitled to be paid for any work done until the 
same is approved by the owner; and acknowl-
edges that the waiver embodied herein does not 
in any way affect any subsequent payment ofL 
payments which may become due under the terms 
of the aforesaid agreement; and further acknowl-
edges that the amount of $18,000.00 ($18,-
000.00 for each of the city and county govern-
ments, for a total of $36,000.00) herein stipu-
lated constitutes full payment for all services 
rendered by architect as of the date of this add-
endum and that architect will not be entitled to 
any further or additional payments from the 
owner until such time as other stages of the work 
have been completed and approved by the Salt 
Lake City Board of Commissioners, as provided 
in the aforesaid agreement. The $18,000.00 paid 
pursuant hereto shall be deemed to be a part 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the total fee due the architect under said 
agreement." (R-35, R-46) (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the parties clearly and unequivocally ac-
knowledged in writing in the original contract that the 
architect was entitled to no compensation for unap-
proved work. Under the supplemental agreement the 
architect received $36,000.00 for unapproved work, at 
variance to the legal obligation of the defendants-re-
spondents under the original contract. Also, the archi-
tect received benefit of accelerated payments from those 
scheduled in the original contract, in addition to an 
affirmation of a contract that could have been can-
celled without compensation to the architect if no ac-
ceptable plans had been developed by it. See Contract, 
R. 27-33. 
Certainly, any one of those benefits given to the 
plaintiff-appellant architect and the concession by the 
city and county constitutes sufficient consideration for 
the agreement. That fact is true notwithstanding the 
fact that the Supplemental Agreement was really a 
bilateral contract; that is, a modification by mutual 
agreement of the original understanding of the parties. 
Clearly, the contract is valid and supported by adequate 
consideration. 
If further discussion is necessary, under the doc-
trine of accord and satisfaction, there was consideration 
as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court has cor-
rectly observed: 
"An accord is an agreement between parties, 
one to give or perform, the other to receive or 
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accept, such agreed payment or performance in 
satisfaction of a claim. The 'satisfaction' is the 
consummation of such agreement. Settlement of 
an unliquidated or disputed claim where the 
parties are a part in good faith presents such con-
sideration." Browing v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance, Soc, 94 U .532, 72 P.2d 1060,1068 (1937). 
If the plaintiff-appellant architect did in fact make 
a claim for work done prior to November 10, 1960, the 
City and County could refuse to pay under the terms 
of the first agreement because no approval had been 
given. The claim was therefore unliquidated and a dis-
puted claim. Settlement of such a claim was an accord 
and satisfaction supported by adequate consideration as 
a matter of law. 
Also, it is clear that by acquiescence the plaintiff-
appellant architect is estopped to deny the validity of 
the Supplemental Agreement by virtue of the benefits 
it has received and the time that has elapsed without 
complaint. As previously stated, the plaintiff-appellant 
received $36,000.00 on or about November 10, 1960. In 
addition, it received the benefit of proceeding with the 
agreement as modified by the Supplemental Agree-
ment for a period of time between November 10, 1960 
and his claim for payment dated January 22, 1969. 
This is a period in excess of eight years. The law of 
estoppel and waiver is clear that he cannot at that late 
date challenge the agreement. The rule is summarized 
as follows: 
"The rule is that where a party with full 
knowledge, of his rights and of all the material 
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facts, remains inactive for a considerable time or 
abstains from impeaching a contract or trans-
action, or freely does what amounts to a recog-
nition thereof as existing, or acts in a manner 
inconsistent with its repudiation and so as to 
affect or interfere with the relation and situation 
of the parties, so that the other party is induced 
to suppose that it is recognized, this amounts to 
acquiescence and the transaction, although orig-
inally impeachable, becomes unimpeachable." 28 
Am. Jur. 2d "Estoppel & Waiver" p. 674, para-
graph 57 and cases therein cited. 
I t is respectfully submitted that the Supplemental 
Agreement of November 10, 1960 is supported by 
adequate consideration, is valid and that even accepting 
arguendo that it lacked consideration, the architect is 
estopped to challenge its validity. 
B. P A R O L E V I D E N C E 
A discussion of this issue has been made supra at 
p. 18. 
C. ECONOMIC COERCION 
The plaintiff-appellant nakedly alleges in its 
Complaint and in answers to Requests for Admissions 
that the Supplemental Agreement of November 10, 
1960 was void because it was obtained by economic co-
ercion. See R-29 and p. 11 of plaintiff-appellant's 
brief. Again, the defendants Salt Lake City and Salt 
Lake County were surprised by this announcement in 
view of the more than eight year lapse of time since 
the architect executed the Supplemental Agreement 
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and the lapse of over a year between the time the pro-
ject had been fully constructed and the first time the 
issue is raised. 
Further, it is interesting that at the pre-trial con-
ference requested by the plaintiff-appellant March 5, 
1973, the appellant architect was unable to establish 
any significant facts, after two years of trial prepara-
tion, to support this charge. Even after filing a Motion 
for Reconsideration, the architect made no proffer of 
proof. See R. 260-273. 
Further, the law regarding a claim of this type is 
clear that a contract alleged to have been obtained by 
duress (coercion) or undue influence is not void; rather 
it is only voidable at the option of the person coerced. 
This court has succinctly observed: 
"Generally, the consequence of duress are void-
able only, not void." State v. Barlow, 107 U. 292, 
153 P.2d 647, 654 (1944) (Emphasis added) 
Further, one cannot accept the benefits of a con-
tract and later attempt to void it on the grounds of 
coercion. This court has correctly observed: 
"As a rule, in a transaction requiring mutual 
consent, if the consent is obtained by coercion, the 
victim may either affirm or void the transaction, 
but he may not claim the benefits and escape the 
obligations" State v. Barlow, id. at p. 654. 
(Emphasis added) 
In addition, the law is clear that the coercion neces-
sary to enable one to void a contract must constitute 
such an overreaching as to be wrongful, unlawful or 
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unconscionable to the court. Federal courts have cor-
rectly observed: 
"A finding of duress at least must reflect a 
conviction that one party to a transaction was so 
improperly imposed upon by the other that a 
court should intervene." Hellenic Lines, Inc. v. 
Dreyfus Corp., 372 F2d 753 (Emphasis added). 
See also, 17 C.J.S., "Contracts" paragraph 178 
at p. 967. 
Using these legal principles, the courts have consistently 
held that mere need or difficult financial circumstances 
are not sufficient. The Michigan Court noted: 
"The fact that a contractor was 'hard-up' when 
he signed the release of claims was not in itself 
sufficient to constitute duress. Norton v. Michi-
gan Highway Dept. 24 N.W.2d 132. 
Our sister state Idaho also noted and observed: 
"Business compulsion is not established merely 
by proof that consent is secured by pressure of 
financial circumstances, or that one party in-
sisted upon a legal right and the other party 
yielded to such insistance. Neither will a mere 
threat to withhold from a party a legal right 
which he has adequate legal remedy to enforce, 
SmwMSfb auress. Generally the demand must 
be wrongful or unlawful, and the other party 
must have no other means of immediate relief 
from the actual or threatened duress than by 
compliance with the demand." Inland Refineries 
v. Jones, 206 P.2d 519, 522 (Idaho 1949). 
Plaintiff's complaint fails to make allegations 
even to state a claim in these regards; rather, it affirms 
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that the supplemental contract "modified" the original 
without even challenging its validity. See plaintiff-ap-
pellant's amended complaint, It. 23-26. Also, the un-
disputed facts show that there was no voidance by 
plaintiff-appellant of the Supplemental Contract: 
rather, he operated under it from November 10, 1#§*F 
until he had received all of the contract benefits. 
I t is respectfully submitted that as a matter of 
law the lower court was correct in its decision. The 
supplemental agreement was supported by adequate 
consideration, the plaintiff received the benefits of the 
agreement and had not at any time voided the Sup-
plemental Agreement. Thus, the architect was and is 
estopped to deny its validity, having elected to affirm 
and work under it. The lower court was justified in 
affirming the agreement as a full accord and satisfac-
tion and ruling as a matter of law that it was not ob-
tained under facts and circumstances which would 
render it void. Therefore, the Items No. 1 and No. 2 
of plaintiff-appellant architect's claim as a matter of 
law are not subject of litigation and were properly 
dismissed by the lower court. 
If further discussion of this point is necessary, it 
is to be noted that coercion is a specie of fraud and 
the 3 year statute of limitation for fraud had long run 
before suit was filed. Price v. The Estate of Havere-
ligh, 428 S.W.2d 422; Leeper v. Beltrami, 347 P.2d 12 
(Calif. 1959); 77 ALR2d 803; Section 78-12-26(3) 
Utah Code Ann., 1953. Also, fraud must be specific-
ally plead, but the architect did not even allege this 
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claim in its amended complaint. (R. 23-26). The 
assertion must fall as a matter of law. 
P O I N T I I I 
I T E M NO. 6 C L A I M E D B Y T H E P L A I N -
T I F F - A P P E L L A N T A R C H I T E C T W H I C H 
T H E U N D I S P U T E D F A C T S S H O W A R E 
NOT P A R T O F A CLAIM U P O N W H I C H 
R E L I E F CAN B E G R A N T E D . 
The undisputed facts show that Item No. 6 is a 
claim for $1,250.00 for non-architectural time allegedly 
expended by Harold K. Beecher in assembling docu-
ments for the civil litigation in the case of Clayton v. 
Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, 15 U.2d 5, 
387 P.2d 93. These facts further show that the total 
time expended by Mr. Beecher, at the request of either 
of the parties-defendant, was an afternoon in prepara-
tion of an affidavit for summary judgment for the 
District Court. Further, the litigation was a case in 
which the plaintiff-appellant architect had an interest 
equal with the city in that by successful defense, he 
received an additional fee of $5,532.10 based on his 
10% percentage fee of the contract cost. 
The time claimed by plaintiff-appellant for Mr. 
Beecher's attendance at various court hearings was 
purely voluntary as he was neither requested to attend 
nor needed to be in attendance. See Statement of Fact 
No. 8F, supra at p. 10. Time spent at depositions 
by Mr. Beecher was required by the plaintiff in that 
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case not the city or the county. Mr. Beecher was sub-
poenaed by said plaintiff and received his statutory 
fee. (R. 225; 231). Certainly, the city and county are 
not additionally responsible to pay for his time in 
attendance. 
Importantly, the contracts subject of the within lit-
igation have no provisions which provide for the com-
pensation of the architect for non-architectural services, 
such as court appearances. Statement of Facts, Nos. 
2 and 5, supra at pages 3 and 5. The plaintiff's com-
plaint did not allege that he is entitled to compensation 
by virtue of quantum meruit or some other implicit 
agreement whereunder the city or the county agreed to 
pay for Mr. Beecher providing the affidavit. Plaintiff-
appellant had an equal interest in that suit with the De-
fendants and no agreement by the city or county was 
made to pay the architect for attending court hearings 
to satisfy his own tmmmm&. I 
There was no benefit received by the defendants-
respondents by the attendance at the court hearings by 
Mr. Beecher. Certainly, the plaintiff-appellant archi-
tect having entered pre-trial conference had a duty to 
render to the court at least a proffer of proof to sup-
port its claim on these issues. I t failed to meet this 
burden and the court properly dismissed these claims. 
P O I N T IV 
A L L CLAIMS OF T H E P L A I N T I F F - A P -
P E L L A N T A R C H I T E C T A B E NOT RECOV-
E R A B L E F O R F A I L U R E TO F I L E A T I M E -
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L Y CLAIM AS R E Q U I R E D B Y T H E PRO-
VISIONS O F 10-7-77 A N D S E C T I O N 63-30-1 E T 
SEQ., U T A H CODE ANN. 1953. F U R T H E R , 
T H E E N T I R E CLAIM O F T H E P L A I N T I F F -
A P P E L L A N T A R C H I T E C T IS B A R R E D BY 
I T S F A I L U R E TO F I L E S U I T W I T H I N 
ONE Y E A R A F T E R T H E D E N I A L O F I T S 
CLAIM AS P R O V I D E D BY U T A H L A W . 
The undisputed facts show that the claims of the 
plaintiff-appellant are based on work done and com-
pleted on the dates as hereinafter stated; to-wit: 
C L A I M S U B J E C T 
Item No. 1— 
Alleged attendance at sundry 
meetings of the Citizens Advisory 
Committee. 
Item No. 2— 
Alleged direct and indirect 
expenses in connection with 
preliminary drawings, outline 
specification and cost estimates 
for "high rise" building. 
Item No. 3— 
Not subject of this appeal. 
Item No. 4— 
Claim for expenses caused by 




May 11, 1960 
Findings of Facts No. 8A 
Supra at p. 7. 
October 6, 1960 
Statement of Facts No. 
Supra at p. 7. 
8A 
Construction lasted from 
June 19, 1963 through 
March 21, 1968. 
Statement of Facts No. 8D 
Supra at p. 9. 
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tern No. 5— 
Tot subject of this appeal. 
tern No. 6— 
?ime in preparation and December 2,1963, 
ssistance in Clayton v. Salt Statement of Facts No. 8F 
.take City and Salt Lake County. Supra at p. 10. 
tern No. 7— 
Vlleged preparation of space February 1,1961, 
tnalysis survey. Statement of Facts No. 8G 
Supra at p. 11. 
[tern No. 8— 
Alleged preparation of square October 6, 
[oot drawings and computations Statement of Facts No. 8H 
for space study. Supra at p. 12. 
Prior to the passage of the Governmental Im-
munity Act in 1965, Utah law clearly provided that 
every claim against a city or town had to be presented 
within one year after the last item of such account or 
claim accrued. The then applicable law stated: 
"Every claim, other than the claims above 
mentioned (those dealing with defective, unsafe 
or dangerous streets or bridges), against any 
city or town must be presented, properly item-
ized or described and verified as to correctness 
by the claimant or his agent, to the governing 
body within one year after the last item of such 
account or claim accrued, . . ." 10-7-77, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953 (Emphasis added); cf. 10-7-77, 
as amended in 1973. 
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The law further clearly provided: 
"I t shall be a sufficient bar and answer to 
any action or proceeding against a city or town 
in any court for the collection of any claim men-
tioned in Section 10-7-77, that such claim had 
not been presented to the governing body of 
such city or town in the manner and within the 
time specified in Section 10-7-77; . . ." 10-7-78, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
I t is undisputed that no claim was filed with the city 
with regard to any of the matters subject of the with-
in litigation prior to January 28, 1969. See State-
ment of Fact No. 8, supra at p. 6. With the excep-
tion of Item No. 4 and No. 8, it is apparent from the 
undisputed facts that no claim was filed within that one 
year period; therefore, the other claims individually are 
barred. Claims No. 4 and No. 8 are discussed hereafter, 
but the lower court's decision on the others should be 
affirmed by this court for this reason alone. 
In addition and supportive of a conclusion that 
all claims are barred, is the fact that in 1965 the Utah 
Legislature passed the Governmental Immunity Act, 
which required that a claim be filed with the political 
subdivision of the state within ninety days after the 
"cause of action" arose. The law states: 
"A claim against a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety days after the cause of action 
arises; provided, however, that any claim filed 
against a city or incorporated town under Sec-
tion 63-30-8 (concerning defective, unsafe or 
dangerous conditions of highways, bridges or 
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structures) shall be governed by the provisions 
of Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953,*' 
63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. 1953.* (Emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, any claim which matured to be a cause of 
action after 1965 had to be filed as a claim with the 
city or county within ninety days. Clearly, on the un-
disputed facts, any claim allegedly maturing to be a 
"cause of action" after 1965 was not timely filed in 
that the latest date for filing would have been June 
22, 1968. This fact is true because that date is 90 days 
subsequent to the date of completion of the construc-
tion contract. See Item No. 4, supra at p. 5. The 
plaintiff-appellant's claim was not filed until January 
28,1969. 
In addition, the Governmental Immunity Act 
provides that claims, once filed, shall be deemed denied 
if the governmental body does not respond within 
ninety days. The law clearly states: 
"A claim shall be deemed to have been denied 
if at the end of the ninety-day period the gov-
ernment entity or its insurance carrier has failed 
to approve or deny the claim." 63-30-14, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953. 
Thereafter, the claimant must file an action within one 
year or the action is barred. The law on this point 
states: 
"Said action must be commenced within one 
year after denial or the denial period as speci-
fied herein." 63-30-13, Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
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The undisputed facts show that the first claim 
made by the plaintiff-appellant architect was dated 
January 22, 1969 and was not submitted to the City or 
County Commissions prior to January 28, 1969. See 
Emraag! of Fact No. 8, supra at p. 6. Therefore, 
that claim would have been deemed denied under the 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act as of 
April 29, 1969; thereafter, the plairrftff would imve 
been obligated to file a suit on or before April 28, H00. 
However, the suit was not filed until April of 1971, 
year#late. 
Admittedly, there is some room for discussion re-
garding the date of denial in that a formal written 
denial was entered under date of February 9, 1970. 
See Statement of Fact No. 11, supra at p. 13. How-
ever, even using that date, the plaintiff-appellant 
would have been obligated to file suit prior to Feb-
ruary 10, 1971, which he did not do. Thus, regardless 
if one uses the implied denial or the written denial, the 
plaintiff failed to file timely litigation as required by 
the Governmental Immunity Act. As such, in addition 
to the fatal defect of failing to timely file a claim, 
the claims are barred as a matter of law. 
The plaintiff-appellant architect's only defense to 
these clear statutory provisions appear to be: (a) Its 
assertion that the Governmental Immunity Act pro-
visions dealing with filing claims do not apply to con-
tract actions (R-25); and (b) That the city and 
county are estopped from asserting the claim in that 
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suit was not filed within a year after the denial of the 
claim. (R-26). 
With reference to its first assertion, there is no 
factual dispute that, excepting only claim Item No. 
4, plaintiff-appellant architect failed to meet the applic-
able provisions of 10-7-77, Utah Code Ann. See dis-
cussion supra at p. 36. Thus, even if the architect's 
argument is accepted arguendo, Section 10-7-77 re-
mains. Therefore, the Governmental Immunity Act 
found in Title 63 is not even needed to defeat those 
claims. 
However, the Governmental Immunity Act by its 
own terms affirmatively states that it applies to con-
tractual obligations; it provides: 
"Immunity from suit for all governmental en-
tities is waived as to any contractual obligation" 
63-30-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953. (Emphasis 
added) 
Further, the Act defines "claim" as follows: 
"The word 'claim' shall mean any claim 
brought against a governmental entity or its em-
ployees as permitted by this act;" 63-30-2(5), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, the word "claim" as used in Sections 63-30-13, 
14 and 15, which impose time limitations for filing 
claims and suit by definition applies to all matters 
covered by the Governmental Immunity Act, including 
contract obligations. If the plaintiff-appellant archi-
tect's contra position were correct and the legislature 
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intended the Governmental Immunity Act only to ap-
ply to torts, it would have used the word "injury" in-
stead of "claim" in those sections, because that word 
is defined to be essentially tort actions. See 63-30-2 
(6), Utah Code Ann. 1953; cf. 63-30-2(5), Utah Code 
Ann. 1953. The naked assertion of the plaintiff-ap-
pellant, unsupported by any authority, is not well taken 
and the lower court's decision should be affirmed. 
The second assertion relating to estoppel, at the 
date of the pre-trial conference constituted a naked 
assertion that plaintiff-appellant was mislead by the 
negotiating for arbitration and, thus, delayed in filing 
timely suit. This position was never reduced to sworn 
affidavit form. Contrarywise, Mr. Jack Crellin under 
oath denied that he had engaged in discussions or nego-
tiations concerning arbitration. His denial of February 
9, 1970 was deemed by him to be final. (R-176). Salt 
Lake County by written decision advised the county 
that arbitration was not a legal requirement and re-
ferred to Mr. Crellin's opinion for a denial. (R-73-75). 
Both city and county commissions responded to the 
plaintiff-appellant's second petition requesting this ar-
bitration with a denial. (R-76, 77). Thus, the matters 
of record at the pre-trial hearing affirmatively indi-
cate that there were no facts and circumstances to 
justify an estoppel theory. 
Further, it is important to note that under Rule 16 
concerning pre-trial conference requested by the plain-
tiff-appellant, he is under an obligation to at least 
make a proffer of proof sufficient to indicate a prima 
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facie case for trial. This obligation plaintiff-appellant 
failed to meet. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted 
that the lower court was justified in its dismissal. 
However, even accepting arguendo the architect's 
position, it has stated no reason or justification why the 
claim dated January 22, 1969 was not timely filed. H e 
has not alleged nor asserted that his delay was by any 
act on the part of the defendants-respondents to raise 
an estoppel theory. Rather, the estoppel question goes 
solely to the filing of suit date in April 1971. There-
fore, in any event, the architect's claims must fail for 
failure to file a timely claim. 
In addition, if no other theory is appropriate, cer-
tainly latches should bar these individual claims. Plain-
tiff-appellant architect received in excess of $630,000.00 
on this project for services rendered and did so with-
out once advising defendant-respondent that he was 
seeking additional compensation. I t received all of the 
benefits and gave no notice for over eight years. The 
plaintiff-appellant architect failed to advise the defend-
ants concerning its claims until the latter part of Janu-
ary 1969, even though most of these were completed 
well before October 6,1966. 
I t is respectfully submitted that the lower court's 
decision dismissing all counts at the preliminary hear-
ing is correct and proper. This court should likewise 
affirm the lower court's decision for the above stated 
reasons. 
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S U M M A R Y 
The suit by the plaintiff-appellant architect seeks 
an additional $130,000.00 on eight separate claims for 
work allegedly done relating to the construction of 
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, in addition to the over 
$630,000.00 it has already received. The individual 
claims No. 1 and No. 2, totalling $6,750.00 and $20,-
981.30 respectively are clearly barred by accord and 
satisfaction agreements dated November 10, 1960 and 
December 30, 1960, and by the architect's failure to 
give any notice of objection to that agreement until 
more than eight years after its execution and years 
after receiving the benefits from the agreement. 
Not only as a matter of law is the plaintiff estop-
ped from challenging the validity of that accord and 
satisfaction agreement, this action on these counts is 
barred by the statute of limitations and the fact that 
im failed to file a timely claim within one year after 
those claims accrued as required by law. Further, it 
failed to file a suit within one year after the denial 
of the claims by the defendants-respondents as re-
quired by law. 
Claims No. 3 and No. 5 were dismissed by stipula-
tion and are not part of the within litigation. 
Claim No. 4 demanding $95,893.15 for alleged 
extra expenses because of delay in the construction is 
barred as a matter of law by virtue of the clear, un-
ambiguous integration of the parties understanding. 
This written contract gave the plaintiff-appellant 
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architect, six percent (6%) of the construction cost 
as an architectural fee. No time limit in the contract 
was specified for the completion of this project; rather, 
the contract clearly contemplated the possibility of an 
extended construction period. In recognition of this 
fact, it granted to the architect additional compensa-
tion for inspection expenses over $15,000.00, if the 
construction were so delayed. Parol evidence is not 
appropriate as suggested by plaintiff under these cir-
cumstances and the lower court so properly ruled. 
However, claim No. 4 is also properly dismissed 
on the grounds that the claim was not timely filed as 
required by Utah law and that suit regarding that 
claim was not filed within one year of the claim's 
denial as required by law. 
Claim No. 6 is a claim of $1,250.00 allegedly for 
services in preparation of a law suit. Such preparation 
and attendance at various court hearings was not sub-
ject of the contract extra work clause, which provided 
only for services for "extra drafting and other ex-
penses due to the changes ordered by the owner or due 
to the delinquency or insolvency of the owner or con-
tractor, or as a result of damage by fire." A few 
hours of time was used by the city attorney in discuss-
ing with Mr. Beecher an affidavit in which it had a 
vested interest by virtue of a contract giving it 10% 
of the purchase contract. In fact, by successful prose-
cution by the city attorney's office, plaintiff-appellant 
received over $5,500.00 of additional compensation. The 
other time expended was solely for his own benefit and 
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curiousity and was not ordered by and was of no bene-
fit to the city or county. The complaint failed to state 
a claim to grant the relief prayed; further, no claim or 
suit was timely filed regarding it. 
Claims No. 6 and No. 7 demand $4,000.00 for 
space analysis surveys and square foot drawings and 
computations. The lower court properly dismissed these 
claims in that the facts clearly show most of the work 
related thereto was covered by the accord and satisfac-
tion agreement of November 10 and December 30, 
1969. Further, they are clearly barred by the failure 
to file a claim with the city or county for a period 
exceeding two years and three months from the date 
that the claim accrued or arose. They are further bar-
red by failure of the plaintiff-appellant architect to 
file suit for more than one year after the claims were 
denied as required by Utah law. 
Conflict in controversy has now existed between 
these parties for a period approaching fifteen years on 
the matters subject of this appeal. After approximate-
ly two years of trial preparation, after requesting a 
pre-trial conference, and after the plaintiff-appellant 
had certified to the court that it was prepared to go 
to trial, the architect could not factually present a 
prima facie case to justify a trial. I t is respectfully 
submitted that the provision of Rule 16 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure concerning pre-trial confer-
ences the court was not only justified but required to 
give the plaintiff-appellant the relief of a judgment of 
dismissal. 
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I t is respectfully submitted that this court should 
affirm the lower court's decision and finally inter the 
carcass of this fifteen year old dispute. Each claim is 
barred by applicable statutes of limitations and suffers 
from multiple other fatal defects. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R I C H A R D S. S H E P H E R D 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Salt Lake County 
C-220 Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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